Publications

Gender Homophily, Collaboration, and Output with Lorenzo Ductor
Online Appendix
Media Coverage: VoxEU Talks, Nada es Gratis
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 2024

Gender and Collaboration with Lorenzo Ductor and Sanjeev Goyal
Online Appendix
Media Coverage: VoxeuTimes Higher Education and what we really said to Times Higher EducationCTN NewsletterNada es GratisThe Economist
The Review of Economics and Statistics 2023

Network Structure and Performance with Ilse Lindenlaub
Online Appendix
Media Coverage: Marketplace, EurekaAlert
The Economic Journal 2021

Micro-Targeting and Polarization
Online Appendix
Journal of Public Economics 2020

Convergence of Cultural Traits with Time-Varying Self-Confidence in the Panebianco (2014) Model - A Corrigendum with Fabrizio Panebianco and Jan-Peter Siedlarek
Journal of Economic Theory 2018

Community Leaders and the Preservation of Cultural Traits with Jan-Peter Siedlarek
Online Appendix
Media Coverage: Zeeconomics
Journal of Economic Theory 2017

Handbook Chapters

Gender and Collaboration with Lorenzo Ductor and Sanjeev Goyal
Chapter in Women in Economics A CEPR Vox eBook, edited by Shelly Lundberg 2020

Religious and Cultural Leaders
Chapter in Advances in the Economics of Religion, Palgrave Macmillan 2019

Working Papers

Value Design in Optimal Mechanisms with Francesco Nava, reject and resubmit AEJ: Micro
A principal allocates a single good to one of several agents whose values are privately and independently distributed, employing an optimal mechanism. The principal shapes the distribution of the agents' values within general classes of constraints. Divisive product designs, which are either highly favored or met with indifference, can simultaneously enhance surplus and diminish information rents by making agents' values more readily discernible. However, such designs also reduce competition among agents. Divisive designs are optimal under various design constraints, as the main drivers of revenue lie in increasing surplus and minimizing information rents, while competition plays a secondary role.
A previous version of the paper received media coverage at Die Presse

An Organizational Theory of Unionization with Francesco Squintani
Motivated by the recent surge in union drives, we present a theoretical model of unionization. A leader assembles an organizational team to persuade coworkers to vote for unionization. If unionization benefits workers, it more likely succeeds when the organizers are credible. Credibility depends on the organizers not being overly pro-union biased and/or bearing significant organizational costs. Hence, we explain why grassroots action is often more effective than professional campaigners in unionizing workplaces. The likelihood of unionization is non-monotonic in organizational costs. With low costs, firms targeting organizers may unintentionally boost unionization. However, sufficiently strong firm opposition renders unionization efforts ineffective.
Additional Mathematica Files: Equilibrium Characterization, Ranking Probabilities, Comparative Statics